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Feminist analytic philosophers have been working in trying to define and 
explain the meaning of “gender”, “race”, “sexuality”, etc., using the tools of 
analytic philosophy in very different ways and from a variety of approaches. 
Many feminist philosophers, for example, have focused on the question of 
whether the concepts of “gender”, “race”, “sexuality” and so on are natural 
kind terms or socially constructed.1 Although we cannot claim that there is full 
agreement on either the methods or the theories forwarded, we can perhaps 
agree that the analysis of the relation between some of these categories is at 
times regarded as an even more difficult and contentious topic than the analysis 
of each category separately.  
It is at this point that the notion of “intersectionality” comes into play as a 
proposal for a framework to deal with the complexity of multiple structures 
(such as gender, race, sexuality, class, age, disability, etc.), on the 
understanding that the categories with which they operate do not act 
independently but rather intersect and create specific oppressions. As Ann 
Garry notes in a recent article, «Feminist philosophers tend to give it 
[intersectionality] lip service, but often fail to construct theories that integrate 
the insights brought to bear by intersectional analyses» (Garry, 2011, p. 
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826).2 Although some work has been undertaken with the concept of 
intersectionality in feminist analytic philosophy, most of the research has been 
conducted by feminists in the social sciences and other feminist theorists not 
necessarily from within the analytical philosophy tradition. This is the case of 
Leslie McCall, an American sociologist who addresses this topic in a way that 
can be fruitful for feminist analytic philosophers. The aim of this commentary is 
to outline and present a critique of her attempt to deal with the question of 
intersectionality.  
In her article, The Complexity of Intersectionality, McCall defines 
“intersectionality” as «the relationships among multiple dimensions and 
modalities of social relations and subject formations» (p. 1171). In the first 
part of the article, she seeks to analyze the relationship between different social 
categories by outlining three approaches differentiated by their use and 
understanding of these categories. In the second part, she presents an 
empirical study as an example of the intersectional approach she favors.  
Before focusing on McCall’s own proposal, some background comments 
are perhaps required to account for the importance of the concept of 
intersectionality within feminist and women’s studies and to explain how it 
emerged within these theories. The specific concept of intersectionality was 
first introduced in the late 1980s by the critical race theorist Kimberlé 
Crenshaw (1989) as a way to describe the interconnections and 
interdependencies among race, gender and class in black women. Her 
contribution followed Black Feminist attempts at decentering white, western, 
heterosexual, middle-class woman who had become the central subject of 
feminist analyses and the measure of feminist politics. Other feminist critical 
race theorists such as bell hooks (1984) and Patricia Hill Collins (1990) 
showed the impossibility of separating out the categories and explaining 
inequalities through a single framework. They challenged the use of ‘woman’ 
as a unitary category reflecting an essentialized vision of all women. Their aim 
was to show how the experiences and struggles of women of color could not be 
explained by feminist or by anti-racist theories. As it is now well known, these 
two theories seemed to imply that “All the Women Are White, All the Blacks 
Are Men”3, so they considered it necessary to question the two concepts of 
 
2 Ann Garry (2011) discusses the concept of intersectionality and proposes a wittgensteinian family 
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“woman” and “black” to illustrate the differences within these categories and, 
more importantly, the fact that interaction between these two categories forms 
specific oppressions such as those of black women. Intersectionality appears as 
a critical feminist proposal that can explore each intersection and which can 
shed light on previously hidden exclusions – black lesbian women, muslim gay 
men, etc. And at the same time it faces the problem of multiple feminine 
subjectivities. As Davis states,  
‘Intersectionality’ addresses the most central theoretical and normative 
concern within feminist scholarship: namely, the acknowledgement of 
differences among women ... This is because it touches on the most pressing 
problem facing contemporary feminism – the long and painful legacy of its 
exclusions (Davis, 2008, p. 70).  
McCall’s understanding of intersectionality starts from the acknowledgment 
that social relations are complex, multiple and intersected and she seeks to 
manage this complexity by distinguishing three approaches that are defined in 
terms of their stance in relation to social categories: anticategorical 
complexity, intracategorical complexity and intercategorical complexity. These 
three approaches are not just conceptual possibilities but emerge from 
different historical positions adopted with respect to the categorization and the 
use of categories within feminist theory. Let’s explore them in more detail.  
First, anticategorical complexity is linked to feminist poststructuralists 
who, according to McCall, offer a deconstruction and rejection of social 
categories and interrogate the boundary-making of categories itself. She adds 
that from this perspective,  
social life is considered too irreducibly complex — overflowing with multiple 
and fluid determinations of both subjects and structures — to make fixed 
categories anything but simplifying social fictions that produce inequalities in 
the process of producing differences (p. 1173).  
Some theorists have seen this approach as the most successful, given the great 
skepticism surrounding the use of categories in a simplistic way. The upshot of 
such an approach is a critical stance towards categorization per se and any 
research that is based on such categorization. 
Second, intracategorical complexity is related to Black Feminism and 
focuses on «particular social groups at neglected points of intersection» (p. 
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1174).4 It is critical of the general use of social categories. It is the approach 
that inaugurates the study of intersectionality by focusing on single groups 
placed at the intersection of multiple categories, but it restricts the scope of 
investigation to only one dimension (for instance, women and black), rather 
than «at the intersection of a full range of dimensions of a full range of 
categories» (p. 1781) – such as considering both women and men and black 
and white. The method normally used in this kind of approach is the case study, 
which investigates the features of a single group or culture and is typically 
associated with qualitative rather than with quantitative methods in the social 
sciences. As McCall states,  
‘the multiple’ in these intersectional analyses refers not to dimensions within 
categories but to dimensions across categories. Thus, an Arab American, 
middle-class, heterosexual woman is placed at the intersection of multiple 
categories (race-ethnicity, class, gender and sexual) but only reflects a single 
dimension of each (p. 1781).  
In this way, other categories of Western, man, black, homosexual, etc., do not 
enter into the analysis.  
Third, intercategorical complexity is the approach McCall endorses. It 
requires adopting existing analytical categories strategically: it uses categories 
but maintains a critical stance towards them. In her words: 
The intercategorical approach […] begins with the observation that there are 
relationships of inequality among already constituted social groups, as 
imperfect and ever changing as they are, and takes those relationships as the 
center of analysis. The main task of the categorical approach is to explicate 
those relationships, and doing so requires the provisional use of categories (pp. 
1784–1785). 
As an example of this approach, McCall presents her own empirical research in 
the second part of the paper. Adopting a statistical approach, she explores 
whether social inequalities among groups even exist, making these 
relationships the focus of analysis itself. The difference between this approach 
and the intracategorical approach is that it deals with complex relationships 
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among social groups rather than with single social groups or categories. The 
subject is thus multigroup, analyzing the intersection across all analytical 
categories and social groups, and her method is systematically comparative 
between them. Her specific intersectional research focuses on wage inequality 
in regional economies in the United States, using a large-scale quantitative 
analysis. She classifies individuals into traditional analytical categories and 
examines relationships of wage inequalities among such groups. She examines 
the dimensions of inequality first and then synthesizes this information into a 
configuration of inequality. The main finding is that patterns of racial, gender 
and class inequality are not the same across configurations, and she concludes 
that «no single dimension of overall inequality can adequately describe the full 
structure of multiple, intersecting and conflicting dimensions of inequality» (p. 
1791).  
Following this brief summary of ‘The Complexity of Intersectionality’, we 
shall now raise a number of critical points. Although McCall’s aim in the paper 
is «simply to introduce alternative perspectives that many feminists have 
overlooked rather than to provide a comprehensive definition or defense of 
them» (p. 1792), she proposes her empirical investigation as a case of the 
intercategorical study she favors. The first problem we would like to underline 
is that she does not specify the relation between the intercategorical approach 
and the particular methodology that should be used. Is the statistical method 
really appropriate for the intercategorical approach? Our tentative answer 
would be that it is not, because the empirical results of her research merely 
restate the existence of complexity but do not explain it. In claiming as a result 
that «no single form of inequality can represent the rest but that some forms of 
inequality seem to arise from the same conditions» (p. 1791), all she shows is 
that complexity is at play, that different forms of inequality exist and that they 
are interrelated, but she does not specify how they do so. 
As for McCall’s treatment of categories, we contend that there are more 
possibilities, other than the one she takes, left open for examination. The study 
of complex, multiple and intersecting social relations from an intercategorical 
approach does not necessarily mean that categories must be used in the 
statistical and rigid way she uses them. Even if we grant that «if structural 
relationships are the focus of the analysis, rather than the underlying 
assumption or context of the analysis, categorization is inevitable» (p. 1786), 
could we not use categories in a way less rigid and more attentive to 
differences? For example, qualitative research could also be based on 
194  Humana.Mente – Issue 22 – September 2012 
 
traditional analytical categories without reinforcing binary and exclusive 
distinctions such as “woman” and “man”, by continuing to use them in a less 
rigid and fixed way (taking into account intersexuals, transsexuals or other 
identities that do not fit into the normative categories such as female/male or 
woman/man). Such a move does not imply turning the analysis into an 
anticategorical one, but it does serve to point out how a wide array of 
methodologies (and maybe not only empirical methods) could fit into the 
intercategorical approach while using categories in a more flexible way. 
Another critical point we would like to stress is that, after having defined 
the three approaches and illustrated her proposal with an empirical case study, 
McCall does not address the question of the relations and/or compatibility 
between the three approaches. On the one hand, it would appear clear that the 
anticategorical approach is incompatible with the other two (intra- and 
intercategorical), precisely because of the requirement of deconstruction of 
categories. On this point, McCall shares with analytic feminists the rejection of 
the poststructuralist project that seeks to undermine identity categories 
deeply. The complex interaction of categories, thus, requires a more complex, 
messy and fluid treatment (see Garry, 2011, p. 830), but this does not lead to 
the abolishment of social categories. On the other hand, the intra- and 
intercategorical approaches are not mutually incompatible, as one 
investigation could focus on a specific group placed at the intersection of 
categories and at the same time be intercategorical in the sense of examining 
these very intersections with not just one but with multiple dimensions. 
Moreover, if the focus of the analysis when following the intercategorical 
approach is the relationship of wage inequality itself, perhaps she is reducing 
the possibilities of the approach instead of widening its scope. Taking 
categories as a starting point for the analysis of multiple oppressions of gender, 
race, sexuality, class, age, (dis)ability and so forth and studying the relationship 
of inequality could provide much more information than she seems to 
acknowledge. Besides using categories in a more complex way, the study of 
relationships of inequality can be studied not only as wage differences but as 
inequalities in civil rights, access to public services, criminalization, violence 
suffered, types of housing, sexual freedom, representativity, mobility, etc. 
which may require a qualitative methodology. It is not that McCall denies that 
the study of these inequalities are not suitable for the intercategorical 
approach, but she does not take them into account nor does she explore the 
possibilities of studying the complexity of inequality itself. 
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These criticisms, while worth making, do not undermine the relevance of 
this paper as a discussion of the relation between different structures. It is now 
a commonplace in feminist studies to believe that the experiences of women 
are not only shaped by gender but by a multiplicity of categories, and 
intersectionality has emerged as a new theory for dealing with difference. As 
McCall herself says, «intersectionality is the most important theoretical 
contribution that women’s studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made 
so far» (p. 1771). Her contribution in this paper is precisely the examination of 
intersectionality as the very object of study, something that had not previously 
been theorized in this way. The classification she offers clarifies different ways 
of working with intersectionality taking into account the historical 
development of feminism itself. 
Furthermore, as she briefly mentions in the paper, examining 
intersectionality has the value of bringing into focus lived experience. If, as 
Audre Lorde said, «there is no such thing as a single-issue struggle because we 
do not live single-issue lives» (Lorde, 1984, p. 183), feminism should deal 
with more frameworks than gender structure because our lived experiences are 
at the same time intersected by our age, class, sexuality, etc. Once experience 
becomes the focus of investigation in examining categories, the need for an 
intersectional approach arises. Because our experience is intersected, its study 
must take this into consideration. And the same is true in the other direction: 
once the relation between different categories of analysis, such as gender, race, 
sexuality, class, etc., becomes the focus of investigation, then experience 
becomes a relevant dimension to examine. An approach along these lines can 
be found in Valentine (2007) in the field of feminist geography, where the 
author illustrates intersectionality precisely as lived experience and considers 
the parameter of space as a key dimension of intersectionality.  
The study of intersectionality is not only a way of granting experience 
relevant status in the investigation, but also it can be seen as providing the 
conditions for any analysis of particular categories. In other words, it has the 
resources to question a study on gender that does not consider sexuality 
variations, or a study on race that does not consider other relevant categories 
and assumes its results apply in general to all the particulars falling under that 
category. That intersectional studies call into question studies of isolated 
categories does not mean that they render them false, rather they just warn us 
about their general applicability: it might be true but only for some particular 
group of people or in a particular set of circumstances. In this line, and in 
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agreement with McCall, we might argue that intersectionality is not a 
methodology but rather a framework, within which different methods and 
methodologies can be developed (see also Garry, 2011, p. 830). The 
advantage of questioning restricted accounts would be its positive value as a 
“framework checker” or “method checker” that provides standards that a 
method or methodology should meet (ibid.).  
McCall’s contribution to feminism and social theory is now more than 
recognized, and as mentioned at the outset, intersectionality is rapidly gaining 
importance in feminist analytic philosophy. The study of intersectionality 
implies great complexity, as is implicit in the title, both as regards the 
examination of social relations from an intersectional point of view and in the 
study of the concept of intersectionality itself. Both senses of complexity could 
greatly inform work in feminist analytic philosophy. To our minds, it is worth 
that feminist analytic philosophers deal with the complexity of intersectionality 
for two main reasons: theoretically, to contribute to feminist debates on the 
concept itself and its implications, and politically because it can provide us with 
the building blocks of a theory that deals with difference, that has de potential 
to be sensitive to new exclusions and to take into account lived experience.  
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